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Abstract
This paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy di¤erentiated products:
suppliers submit o¤ers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes),
and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium
behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers private information is multidimensional (char-
acterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence). In addition, we show
that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying di¤erenti-
ated products, including menu auctions, beauty contests and price-only auctions with minimum
quality thresholds.
This paper supersedes an earlier paper distributed under the title Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions.We thank
Max Bazerman, Matthew Jackson, Luca Rigotti, Al Roth, Nicolas Sahuguet as well as audiences at Barcelona Auc-
tion Workshop 2005, Case Western Reserve, CORE, Decentralization Conference 2004, ECARES, Essex, Gerzensee,
Harvard/MIT, Inform2003, London Business School, London School of Economics, New York University, Ohio State
University, Rome Auction Conference 2004, University College London and WZB Berlin for useful conversation and
suggestions. The Editor and two anonymous referees provided useful comments. Ioannis Ioannou provided excel-
lent research assistance. The nancial support of the Division of Research at Harvard Business School is gratefully
acknowledged.
yLeonard N. Stern School of Business, NYU. Email: jasker@stern.nyu.edu.
zFNRS, ECARES (Université Libre de Bruxelles) and CEPR, email: Estelle.Cantillon@ulb.ac.be
1 Introduction
In many procurement situations the buyer cares about attributes other than price when evaluating
the o¤ers submitted by suppliers. Examples of non monetary attributes that buyers care about
include lead time, time to completion, and quality. Buyers have adopted several practices for
dealing with these situations. Some use detailed request-for-quotes (RFQ) that specify minimum
standards that the o¤ers need to satisfy, and then evaluate the submitted bids based on price only.
Others select a small set of potential suppliers and negotiate on all dimensions of the contract with
each of them.
A third option is to combine the competition induced by a RFQ with the exibility in terms of
contract specication o¤ered by negotiation. Several procedures belong to this category. In a
menu auction, the buyer lets suppliers submit menus of price and non monetary attributes, and
choose the combination that best suits his needs. In a beauty contest, the buyer tells suppliers
he cares about other attributes than price but requests a single o¤er from them. Again, he chooses
the o¤er he prefers from the received o¤ers. In a scoring auction, the buyer announces the way he
will rank the di¤erent o¤ers, that is, the scoring rule; suppliers submit an o¤er on all dimensions of
the product, and the contract is awarded to the supplier who submitted the o¤er with the highest
score according to the scoring rule.
In this paper, we study the properties of scoring auctions in which price enters linearly into the
scoring rule. Examples of such scoring auctions include A+B bidding for highway construction
work in the US, where the highway procurement authorities evaluate o¤ers on the basis of their costs
as well as time to completion, weighted by a road user cost,1 and auctions for electricity reserve
supply (Bushnell and Oren, 1994; Wilson, 2002). The European Union has recently adopted a new
public procurement directive. The new law allows for two di¤erent award criteria: lowest cost and
best economic value. The new provisions require that the procurement authority publishes ex-ante
the relative weighting of each criterion used when best economic value is the basis for the award.2 In
e¤ect, the new law mandates the use of scoring auctions. This is signicant as public procurement
in the EU is estimated at about 16% of GDP.3 The use of scoring auctions is also gaining favor in
the private sector, with several procurement software developers incorporating scoring capability
in their auction designs.
1The road user cost is the (per day) value of time lost due to construction. By 2003, 38 states in the US were
using A+B bidding for large projects for which time is a critical factor. See, for instance, Arizona Department of
Transport (2002) and Herbsman, Chen and Epstein (1995).
2See Articles 55 and 56 of Directive 2004/17/EC and Articles 53 and 54 of Directive 2004/18/EC. If the authority
does not resort to electronic auctions, it may publish a range of weightings for each criterion instead.
3http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/publicprocurement/introduction_en.htm
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A distinguishing feature of our model is that suppliers private information about their cost is
multidimensional. This means that the low cost supplier for the base option is not necessarily the
low cost supplier when it comes to increasing quality on some other dimension. It allows us to
consider the likely situation where rms di¤er in their xed and variable costs of production. Our
motivation for allowing multidimensional private information is to build a model of scoring auctions
that can generate equilibrium predictions that mimic what is observed in the data. When private
information is one-dimensional, equilibrium o¤ers can be parametrized by a single parameter and
describe a curve in the price - attributes space (Che, 1993). Our model does not su¤er from this
severe limitation.
We derive two sets of results. First, we characterize equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when
private information is multidimensional and the scoring rule is linear in price. We prove that the
multidimensionality of suppliersprivate information can be reduced to a single dimension (their
pseudotype) that is su¢ cient to characterize the equilibrium in these auctions (Theorem 1). This
allows us to establish a correspondence between the set of scoring auctions and the set of standard
single object one-dimensional independent private value (IPV) auction environments (Corollary 1).
The equilibrium in the scoring auction inherits the properties of the corresponding standard IPV
auction (existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, e¢ ciency, ...). We also prove a new expected
utility theorem for the buyer when private information is multidimensional and independently
distributed and the scoring rule is linear in price (Theorem 2).
Our second set of results compares scoring auctions to other common procedures used to buy
di¤erentiated products. We show that, from the buyers perspective, scoring auctions strictly
dominate price-only auctions with minimum quality standards. They weakly dominate a menu
auction and a beauty contest when an open ascending format is used (the open ascending format is
often used for online procurement). When a sealed bid second priceformat is used, they weakly
dominate a menu auction and strictly dominate a beauty contest. Finally, the ranking between
the rst price scoring auction and the rst price menu auction is ambiguous: we nd that some
buyers prefer the menu auction while others prefer the scoring auction. Moreover, we establish
that rst price menu auctions are always ine¢ cient. Note that our purpose in this paper is not to
determine how to optimally buy a di¤erentiated product but, instead, to study the properties of
a commonly used and simple procedure for doing so, the scoring auction. Thus, our second set of
results provides a motivation for focussing on the scoring auction given its attractive properties.
Related literature: There are several papers studying scoring auctions. Most papers note, as we do,
that, once the scoring rule is given, the maximum level of social welfare a supplier can produce (in
our paper, the pseudotype) can be used to construct an equilibrium in these auctions. This involves
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a benign change of variables when private information is one-dimensional as in Che (1993) and
Branco (1997), but the operation is not so anodyne when private information is multidimensional.
Specically, we show that such a reduction in dimensionality requires that (1) the scoring rule
be linear in price, and (2) that private information be independently distributed across suppliers,
unless the auction format admits a dominant strategy equilibrium. The papers we are aware of
that allow for multidimensional private information, Bushnell and Oren (1994 and 1995), happen
to satisfy these conditions (these papers derive the scoring rule that induces productive e¢ ciency
in an environment with multidimensional private information). There is also a series of papers on
scoring auctions published in the Computer Science and Operations Research literature. The focus
there is on implementability through practical online / iterative processes (see e.g. Bichler and
Kalagnanam, 2003 and Parkes and Kalagnanam, 2005).4
Several recent papers study other auction environments with multidimensional private information.
In some environments, bidder preferences, the structure of information or the specic allocation
mechanism suggest the locus of types likely to use the same bidding strategies at equilibrium.
These pseudotypes are used to construct an equilibrium (see, e.g., Che and Gale, 1998, Fang
and Parreiras, 2002, de Frutos and Pechlivanos, 2006). Our approach is identical, except for the
fact that, in addition, we prove that no other equilibrium exists. This allows us to derive a utility
equivalence theorem and to leverage the analogy between our environment and the standard IPV
environment.5
Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2005) derive the optimal buying mechanism when quality mat-
ters. A scoring auction in which price enters linearly into the scoring rule implements the optimal
scheme when private information is one-dimensional. Under some conditions on the cross-partial
derivative of costs, the optimal scoring rule underweighs quality relative to the true preference of the
buyer. When private information is multidimensional, Asker and Cantillon show that the buyer is
still interested in distorting qualities away from their e¢ cient levels. However, the optimal scheme
can no longer be implemented by a scoring auction with a scoring rule that is linear in price. Nev-
ertheless, they provide numerical examples suggesting that such scoring auctions perform almost
as well as the optimal scheme.
4A variant of scoring auctions are auction environments that involve the purchase of multiple items but where the
buyer cannot commit, at the time of the auction, to the quantity purchased. Examples include the sale of timber
rights or the purchase of electricity reserve supply. The scoring rule is used for allocating the contract, though the
nal contract often depends on the realized quantities. This creates interesting incentive problems (see Athey and
Levin, 2001, Chao and Wilson, 2002, and Ewerhart and Fieseler, 2003). We ignore these aspects in the current paper.
5A similar property (though through a much more subtle analogy to the standard IPV model) is exploited by Che
and Gale (2006) to rank revenue in single-object auctions with multidimensional types and non linear payo¤s.
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Finally, a few papers consider alternatives to scoring auctions. Che (1993) provides a qualita-
tive argument for why scoring auctions are better than price-only auctions with minimum quality
standards in his one-dimensional framework. Bichler and Kalagnanam (2003) look at the second
scoremenu auction. They focus on the winner determination problemfor a given set of o¤ers
received, not on equilibrium behavior. Menu auctions can be seen as a common agency problem
where multiple principals (the suppliers) compete in o¤ering menus of contracts to an agent (the
buyer). From suppliersperspective, menu auctions are also an example of a screening problem with
random participation because a suppliers o¤er is accepted only if it is better than the competing
o¤ers the buyer received. We draw on these literatures when we study the rst price menu auc-
tion. We consider menu auctions, beauty contests and price-only auctions with minimum quality
standards, and systematically compare the outcome of equilibrium in these auctions with that in
scoring auctions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and introduces the
notion of pseudotype. Section 3 proves that the pseudotypes are su¢ cient statistics in our envi-
ronment, and establishes the correspondence between scoring auctions and regular IPV auctions.
Our expected utility equivalence theorem is proved in section 4. Section 5 compares the outcome of
scoring auctions with that of menu auctions, a beauty contest and auctions with minimum quality
standards. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Environment
We consider a buyer seeking to procure an indivisible good for which there are N potential suppliers.
The good is characterized by its price, p; and M  1 non monetary attributes, Q 2 RM+ :
Preferences: The buyer values the good (p;Q) at v(Q; t) p; where t 2 [t; t] indexes the buyers taste
for quality.6 Supplier is prot from selling good (p;Q) is given by p   c(Q;i); where i 2 RK ;
K  1; is supplier is type. We allow suppliers to be exible with respect to the level of non
monetary attributes they can supply.7 We assume that v and c are twice continuously di¤erentiable
with vQ; cQ > 0 and vQQ   cQQ negative denite. In particular, this allows for costs that are
independent across attributes and convex in individual attributes. We partially order the type
6Until Section 5, in which we consider alternative mechanisms to the scoring auction, nothing is lost if t is assumed
to be common knowledge. We introduce the notation here for completeness.
7Rezende (2004) studies a procurement model with xed levels of non monetary attributes. In our model, the
level of non monetary attributes is determined during the auction process.
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space by assuming that ci > 0: When we analyze the rst price menu auction we will also impose
vQt > 0 and vQQt negative semi-denite.
Because social welfare is strictly concave in Q; the rst best level of non monetary attributes for
each supplier, QFB(i) = argmaxfv(Q; t)  c(Q;i)g is well-dened and unique.
Information: Preferences are common knowledge among suppliers and the buyer, with the exception
of supplierstypes, i; i = 1; :::N; and the buyers taste parameter t; which are privately observed:
Types are independently distributed according to the continuous joint density function fi(:) with
support on a bounded and convex subset of RK ; i  RK : Taste is distributed according to the
continuous density h(:): These density functions are common knowledge.
Allocation mechanism
We now introduce the scoring auction. We start with two denitions:
A scoring rule is a function S : RM+1+ ! R : (p;Q) ! S(p;Q); that associates a score to any
potential contract and represents a continuous preference relation over contract characteristics
(p;Q): A scoring rule is quasilinear if it can be expressed as (Q)  p or any monotonic increasing
function thereof. We assume that the scoring rule is twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly
increasing in Q; and that the resulting apparent social welfare, (Q)  c(Q;) is strictly concave
in Q for all : For simplicity, we let maxQf(Q)  c(Q;)g  0 for all  to ensure that all suppliers
participate in the auction at equilibrium.
A scoring auction is an allocation mechanism where suppliers submit bids of the type (p;Q) 2
RM+1+ : Bids are evaluated according to a scoring rule. The winner is the bidder with the highest
score. The outcome of the scoring auction is a probability of winning the contract, xi; a score to
fulll when the supplier wins the contract, tWi ; and a payment to the buyer in case he does not, t
L
i :
A scoring auction is quasilinear when it uses a quasilinear scoring rule.
For example, in a rst score scoring auction, the winner must deliver a contract that generates the
value of his winning score, i.e. tWi = S(pi;Qi); t
L
i = 0: In an ascending scoring auction, the buyer
progressively raises the required score to fulll by any standing o¤er until all suppliers but one drop
out. tWi is the value of that score and t
L
i = 0: In a second score scoring auction, the winner must
deliver a contract that generates a score equal to the score of the second best o¤er received.
Note that when the scoring rule does not correspond to the buyers preference - something which
might be in his interest (Che, 1993, Asker and Cantillon, 2005) - commitment is essential. In public
procurement, this might be easily done. The process must often abide by a strict set of rules and
procedures, so that in e¤ect, the call for tender (and thus the scoring rule) is legally binding for
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the buyer. In private procurement, this might be harder, although, in principle, the buyer could
sign a contract with the bidders before bidding takes place in which he commits to use the scoring
rule. Such a contract could be enforced through an independent third party audit. Repetition is
an alternative mechanism.
We now proceed to the analysis of bidding behavior in the scoring auction. Consider supplier i
with type i who has won the contract with score to fulll tWi : Supplier i will choose characteristics
(p;Q) that maximize his prot, i.e.
max
(p;Q)
fp  c(Q;i)g subject to (Q)  p = tWi
Substituting for p into the objective function yields
max
Q
f(Q)  c(Q;i)  tWi g (1)
An important feature of (1) is that the optimal Q is independent of tWi : Dene
k(i) = max
Q
f(Q)  c(Q;i)g
We shall call k(i); supplier is pseudotype. It is the maximum level of apparent social surplus that
supplier i can generate. Bidderspseudotypes are well-dened as soon as the scoring rule is given.
The set of supplier is possible pseudotypes is an interval in R. The density of pseudotypes inherits
the smooth properties of fi: With this denition, supplier is expected prot is given by:
xi
 
k(i)  tWi
  (1  xi)tLi (2)
In (2), supplier is preference over contracts of the type (xi; tWi ; t
L
i ) is entirely captured by his
pseudotype. Only quasilinear scoring rules have this property when private information is multi-
dimensional. Indeed, consider a more general scoring rule S(p;Q). Assume that S is twice contin-
uously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing in Q and strictly decreasing in p: Bidder is optimization
problem becomes:
max
(p;Q)
fp  c(Q;i)g subject to S(p;Q) = tWi (3)
Let 	(Q; tWi ) be the price required to generate a score of t
W
i with non monetary attributes Q (	 is
well-dened since S is strictly decreasing in p and strictly increasing in Q; it is strictly decreasing
in Q and strictly increasing in tWi ): The objective function of bidder i becomes
max
Q
f	(Q; tWi )  c(Q;i)g;
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and his expected payo¤ from contract (xi; tWi ; t
L
i ) is given by:
u(xi; t
W
i ; t
L
i ;i) = ximax
Q
f	(Q; tWi )  c(Q;i)g   (1  xi)tLi
Suppose we can organize types in equivalence classes such that all types in a given class share the
same preferences over contracts. Concretely, suppose that types i and bi 6= i belong to such a
class. It must be that
u(xi; t
W
i ; t
L
i ;i) = u(xi; t
W
i ; t
L
i ;
bi) if and only if u(bxi;btWi ;btLi ;i) = u(bxi;btWi ;btLi ; bi) (4)
for all pairs of contracts (xi; tWi ; t
L
i ); (bxi;btWi ;btLi ):
LetQ(i; tWi ) = argmaxQf	(Q; tWi ) c(Q;i)g: Condition (4) requires that @@tWi 	(Q(i; t
W
i ); t
W
i ) =
@
@tWi
	(Q(bi; tWi ); tWi ): This equality will in general not be satised for bi 6= i unless 	 is separable
in Q and tWi : In turn, this requires that the scoring rule be quasi-linear (	(Q; t
W
i ) = (Q)   tWi
for a quasi-linear scoring rule).8
Finally we carry out one last simplication of the problem. Let si = xitWi + (1   xi)tLi in (2).
Given suppliersrisk neutrality and the linearity of the scoring rule, there is no loss in dening the
outcome of a scoring auction as the pair (xi; si); rather than (xi; tWi ; t
L
i ): Suppliersexpected payo¤
is thus given by
xik(i)  si (5)
Notation: For the remainder, we adopt the following notation and conventions. The outcome
function of a scoring auction is a vector of probabilities of winning (x1; :::; xN ) and scores to fulll
by each supplier, (s1; :::; sN ): (If the outcome in a given scoring auction is stochastic, these are
distributions over vectors of probabilities of winning and scores.) The arguments in these functions
are the bids submitted by all suppliers, f(pi;Qi)gNi=1:9 Later in the paper, we will switch to a direct
revelation mechanism approach where the outcome will be a function of supplierspseudotypes,
(k1; :::; kN ) 2 RN : To avoid introducing too much new notation, we shall make these the arguments
of the x and s functions. We shall also write xi(ki) to denote the expectation of xi over the types
of the other suppliers, Ek ixi(ki; k i): The arguments will be spelled out whenever confusion is
possible.
8The requirement of quasilinearity of the scoring rule is only needed when private information is multidimensional.
When private information is one-dimensional there is a one-to-one mapping between types and pseudotypes. The
equivalence classes of types with the same preferences are thus singletons.
9Or, more generally, in the case of open formats, the strategies of the bidders.
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3 A su¢ cient statistics result
Supplierspseudotypes are su¢ cient statistics in this environment if knowing the distribution of
supplierspseudotypes is all one needs in order to describe the set of equilibria of the auction and
evaluate the buyers expected payo¤.
In this section, we prove that pseudotypes are su¢ cient statistics. Specically, we show that the sets
of equilibria in the scoring auction and in a auction where bidders are constrained to submit a bid
only as a function of their pseudotypes coincide. Proving this result requires two preliminary steps.
First, we show that all equilibria of the scoring auction are outcome equivalent to an equilibrium
where suppliers are forced to submit bids only as a function of their pseudotypes. We dene two
equilibria as outcome equivalent if they both lead to the same distribution of outcomes (x1; :::; xN )
and (s1; :::; sN ): Because outcome equivalence is not enough to guarantee that the buyer is indi¤erent
among these equilibria, we next prove that equilibria in scoring auctions are essentially pure as a
function of pseudotypes.
Lemma 1: All equilibria of a quasilinear scoring auction are outcome equivalent to an equilibrium
where bidders with the same pseudotypes adopt the same strategies.
Proof: Consider any equilibrium (E1; :::; EN ) where Ei is a mapping from i to a distribution over
(p;Q) 2 RM+1: Then for all i; for all i and all (pi ;Qi ) in the support of supplier is equilibrium
strategy,
(pi ;Q

i ) 2 argmax
p;Q
E i

xi
 
(p;Q); (p i;Q

 i)

ki (i)  si((p;Q); (p i;Q i))

(6)
where the expression for supplier is expected prot derives from (5). In (6), suppliersprivate
information enters their objective function only through their pseudotypes. Thus, supplier i is
indi¤erent among the strategies played by all the realizations of supplier is type with the same
pseudotype.
We can construct a new equilibrium (eE1; :::; eEN ); such that:
1. eEi(i) = eEi(bi) whenever k(i) = k(bi):
2. Dene i(k) = fi 2 ijk(i) = kg: For each k in the support of bidder is pseudotypes;
the distribution over (p;Q) generated by eEi for a given i 2 i(k) replicates the aggregate
distribution over (p;Q) over all i 2 i(k) under Ei:
By construction, the distribution of bidder is opponents strategies is the same as before from
bidder is perspective. Moreover, eEi is a best response for bidder i. Hence it is an equilibrium,
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and biddersstrategies are only a function of their pseudotypes. By construction, (eE1; :::; eEN ) and
(E1; :::; EN ) lead to the same distribution of (p;Q) and therefore scores and outcomes. Q.E.D.
An aspect of Lemma 1 worth stressing is the role played by the assumption that types are indepen-
dent across bidders. From the expression of suppliersexpected prot, xik(i) si; we already know
that their payo¤s are only a function of their pseudotypes. Independence ensures that their beliefs
are also independent of their types beyond their pseudotypes (actually independence is stronger: it
makes suppliersbeliefs independent of their types and pseudotypes). Without independence, bid-
dersprivate information would enter their expected payo¤ in (6), both through their pseudotypes
and through their expectations over their opponentstypes.
Lemma 1 implies that the set of possible outcomes (x1; :::; xN ) and (s1; :::; sN ) can be generated by
equilibria where suppliers bid exclusively on the basis of their pseudotypes. However, it does not
imply that nothing is lost by restricting attention to these equilibria. Outcome equivalence does
not imply utility equivalence for the buyer. To see this consider the following example.
Consider two equally likely types, i and bi (this assumption is inessential for the argument) such
that k(i) = k(bi) and suppose that in equilibrium, they get a di¤erent outcome: (xi; si) and
(bxi; bsi): By denition, these two types generate expected utility fi(i)si + fi(bi)bsi for the buyer,
according to the scoring rule. However, this di¤ers from true expected utility if (:) 6= v(:; t).
To know how much expected utility the suppliers generate for the buyer, we need to know how
they will satisfy their obligations. Let Q and bQ be the choice of i and bi respectively (these are
independent of si and bsi): The total monetary transfer from the buyer to the suppliers is then given
by xi(Q)  si and bxi(bQ)  bsi; and the buyers true expected utility is given by:
fi(i)
h
xi (v(Q; t)  (Q)) + si + bxi v(bQ; t)  (bQ)+ bsii
This equilibrium is outcome-equivalent to an equilibrium where type i adopts bis strategy and
vice versa. In that equilibrium the buyers true expected utility is given by
fi(i)
hbxi (v(Q; t)  (Q)) + bsi + xi v(bQ; t)  (bQ)+ sii
Clearly, the buyer is not indi¤erent between these two equilibria unless xi = bxi or v(Q; t) = (Q):
The next result ensures that suppliers with the same pseudotypes receive the same equilibrium
outcome function (xi; si), except possibly on a set of measure zero. This rules out the situation
described in the previous example.
Lemma 2: All equilibrium strategies in quasilinear scoring auctions are essentially pure, both when
expressed as a function of pseudotypes and (a fortiori) when expressed as a function of types.
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Proof: If there exists a non trivial mixed strategy equilibrium (where non trivial refers to mixing
for a non zero measure of types), then, by Lemma 1, there exists a non trivial mixed strategy
equilibrium in the pseudotype space. Therefore, we shall focus on equilibrium strategies as a
function of pseudotypes to rule out non trivial mixed strategy equilibria.
For each pseudotype k; dene xi (k) and xi (k) as the lowest and highest expected probabilities of
getting the contract among all the bids in the support of bidder is strategy when he has pseudotype
k (let si(k) and si(k) be the resulting expected score to satisfy): By construction, xi (k) = xi (k)
when bidder i of pseudotype k uses a pure strategy.
Dene Ui(k) as supplier is equilibrium expected payo¤ when he has pseudotype k: Incentive com-
patibility implies that
Ui(k) = xi (k) k   si (k)  xi(bk)k   si(bk) = Ui(bk) + xi(bk)(k   bk)
Ui(bk) = xi(bk)bk   si(bk)  xi(k)bk   si(k) = Ui(k)  xi(k)(k   bk)
Hence xi (k) is monotonically increasing in k. The same argument applies to xi(k): Hence xi (k) and
xi(k) are almost everywhere continuous. A similar argument based on the IC constraint establishes
that xi(k)  xi(bk) for all bk < k: Together with the a.e. continuity of these functions, this implies
that xi(k) = xi(k) (and si(k) = si(k)) almost everywhere. This rules out mixed strategy equilibria.
Q.E.D.
We are now able to prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 1: The set of equilibria (mappings from 1...N to (pi;Qi)Ni=1) in the scoring auction
is the same as the set of equilibria in the scoring auction where suppliers are constrained to bid
only on the basis of their pseudotypes, except possibly on a set of measure zero.
Proof: Lemma 2 implies that all equilibria in the scoring auction are equilibria in the constrained
auction (they di¤er at most on a set of measure zero). All equilibria in the constrained auction are
also equilibria in the scoring auction because bidderspreferences and beliefs are entirely determined
by their pseudotypes. Q.E.D.
Most theoretical analyses of scoring auctions have implicitly or explicitly taken advantage of pseudo-
types to derive an equilibrium in these auctions (Che, 1993, Bushnell and Oren, 1994 and 1995).
Theorem 1 suggests that doing so does not discard any other equilibria of interest. While this may
not be totally surprising when types are one-dimensional, this result is not trivial for environments
where types are multidimensional. This property is a consequence of the combination of the qua-
silinear scoring rule, the single dimensionality of the allocation decision, and the independence of
types across bidders. We cannot reduce the strategic environment to one-dimensional private in-
formation if any of these conditions does not hold. As argued in section 1, the quasilinearity of the
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scoring rule is necessary to be able to summarize supplierspreferences over contracts by a single
number. As noted after Lemma 1, independence was needed to make suppliersbeliefs indepen-
dent of their types. Neither condition is necessary to use pseudotypes to derive an equilibrium in
the one-dimensional model (for example, Branco (1997) extends Ches model to correlated private
information).
The next result makes the relationship between scoring auctions and standard one object auctions
even more explicit:
Corollary 1: The equilibrium in quasilinear scoring auctions with independent types inherits the
properties of the equilibrium in the related single object auction where (1) bidders are risk neutral,
(2) their (private) valuations for the object correspond to the pseudotype k in the original scoring
auction and are distributed accordingly, (3) the highest bidder wins, and (4) the payment rule is
determined as in the scoring auction, with biddersscores being replaced by biddersbids.
Corollary 1 has practical implications for the derivation of the equilibrium in scoring auctions. It
forms the basis for the following simple algorithm for deriving equilibria in scoring auctions: (1)
Given the scoring rule, derive the distribution of pseudotypes, Gi(k); (2) Solve for the equilibrium
in the related IPV auction where valuations are distributed according to Gi(k), bi(k); and (3) The
equilibrium bid in the scoring auction is any (p;Q) such that S(p;Q) = bi(k): (The actual (p;Q)
delivered are easy to derive given bi(k) and the solution to equation (2).)
4 Expected utility equivalence across auction formats
In this section, we extend the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (Myerson, 1981, Riley and Samuelson,
1981) to multi-attribute environments. Che (1993) proved the utility equivalence between the rst
and second score scoring auction when types are one-dimensional and the scoring rule corresponds
to the buyers true preference. Theorem 2 shows that this result extends to multidimensional
private information and scoring rules that do not correspond to the buyers true preference.
Theorem 2 (Expected Utility Equivalence). Any two scoring auctions that:
(a) use the same quasilinear scoring rule,
(b) use the same allocation rule xi(ki; k i); i = 1; :::; N; and
(c) yield the same expected payo¤ for the lowest pseudotype ki; i = 1; :::; N:
generate the same expected utility for the buyer.
Proof: Because the buyers utility is quasilinear, his expected utility from a given auction is
NX
i=1
Eki;k i [xi (ki; k i)ESS (ki)  Ui (ki)] =
NX
i=1
Eki [xi (ki)ESS (ki)  Ui (ki)] (7)
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where ESS(ki) is the expected social surplus generated by awarding the contract to bidder i with
pseudotype ki.
By Theorem 1, we can focus on equilibria which are only functions of pseudotypes. Incentive
compatibility implies that Ui(ki) is almost everywhere di¤erentiable and that ddkiUi(ki) = xi(ki);
where xi(ki) is a well-dened function almost everywhere by Lemma 2. Hence, (b) and (c) imply
that Ui(k) is the same across both auctions.
Next, x ki and let (p(i; si);Q(i; si)) be the realized contract of supplier i with type i 2 i(ki);
when the score to satisfy is si: Because the scoring rule is quasi-linear, Q(i; si) is only a function
of the scoring rule and i; and not of si (cf. (1)). Hence,
ESS(ki) = Ei2i(ki)[v(Q
; t)  c(Q;i)]
is independent of si and equal across the two auctions given (a). The claim follows. Q.E.D.
Three points are worth noting concerning this result. First, the assumption that the scoring rule
is quasilinear is key. Without it, supplierschoice of product characteristics (p;Q) would depend
on the form of the resulting obligation, that is, the auction format.
Second, the proof of Theorem 2 relies on the fact that any equilibrium is essentially pure as a
function of pseudotypes (i.e. xi are functions). Without this property, expected utility equivalence
between two auctions that yield the same distribution of allocations as a function of pseudotypes
would only hold when the scoring rule corresponds to the true valuation (cf. the argument before
Lemma 2). In that case, EES(ki) = ki and the result holds trivially
Third, Theorem 2 implies the standard equivalence between the rst score auction, the second score
auction and the Dutch and English auctions when bidders are symmetric. However, the symmetry
requirement is with respect to the distribution of pseudotypes and not the distribution of types. In
particular, some bidders can (stochastically) be stronger for one attribute and others for another
attribute, yet, when it comes to pseudotypes, they can be symmetric.
5 Comparison with alternatives
In this section, we consider three alternatives to scoring auctions under three di¤erent auction
formats, and for simplicity we focus on the case where suppliers are ex-ante symmetric. We show
that, except for the rst price menu auction, these alternatives generate equal or lower expected
utility for the buyer than a scoring auction that uses the true preference of the buyer. Thus, a
fortiori, a scoring auction with an optimally chosen scoring rule dominates these alternatives. We
next describe these procedures in detail and discuss some of their properties.
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Menu Auctions:10 In the menu auction, the buyer does not reveal his type. Instead, suppliers are
asked to submit (p;Q) schedules. The buyer selects the o¤er that generates the highest level of
utility. This alternative comes in three versions. In the Ascendingversion (A), the auction takes
place over several rounds. In each round, the buyer selects the supplier whose schedule generates
the greatest utility. In the next round, the other suppliers are invited to submit new schedules and
the process continues until no further o¤ers are made. The winner is the supplier who o¤ers the
best schedule in the last round. The resulting contract is the (p;Q) in his schedule that the buyer
prefers. In the First Priceversion (FP), the winner is the supplier o¤ering the (p;Q) contract
that generates the highest utility to the buyer and this is the resulting contract. Finally, in the
Second Priceversion (SP), the winner is the supplier o¤ering the (p;Q) contract that generates
the highest utility to the buyer and the resulting contract is (bp;Q) where bp is adjusted so that
(bp;Q) generates the same score as the best o¤er by the losers.11
Menu auctions introduce an interesting new twist: suppliers must now account for the fact that
the buyer selects the o¤er he prefers in the submitted menus. Let (Q(t;); p(t;))t2T denote the
menu submitted by a supplier of type , with the indexing such that (Q(t;); p(t;)) is the o¤er
preferred by the buyer with taste t: Incentive compatibility for the buyer requires that
v(Q(t;); t)  p(t;)  v(Q(bt;); t)  p(bt;) 8t;bt 2 T; (8)
that is, using standard arguments and the fact that vQt > 0 (vQt ensures that Q is monotonic and
thus a.e. di¤erentiable),
vQ(Q(t;); t)Qt(t;) = pt(t;) for all  and all t at which Q is di¤erentiable (9)
Lemma 3: Consider any incentive compatible menu (Q(t;); p(t;))t2T : This menu induces e¢ cient
production for all t; if and only if (a) it corresponds to an ex-post iso-prot curve of supplier with
type  and (b) Qt(t;) > 0 except on a set of measure zero.
Proof: E¢ cient production requires
vQ(Q(t;); t) = cQ(Q(t;);) for all t; (10)
Condition (b) follows directly from the requirement of e¢ ciency together with the assumption
that vQt > 0: Suppliers ex-post iso-prot curve are described by the locus of o¤ers such that
p(t;)  c(Q(t;);) is constant; that is:
cQ(Q(t;);)Qt(t;) = pt(t;) for all  and all t at which Q is di¤erentiable (11)
10Bichler and Kalagnanam (2003) use the expression auctions with congurable o¤ersto describe such procedures.
11Note that commitment will again be essential here. The buyer must be able to convince suppliers that he will
not manipulate the (unannounced) scoring rule in order to increase the value of the second best o¤er.
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Because Qt(t;) 6= 0; conditions (10) and (11) are equivalent given (9) (continuity of the e¢ cient
production level in t ensures that (10) is satised at non di¤erentiability points of Q. Q.E.D.
Beauty Contests: In a beauty contest, the buyer does not reveal his type and the suppliers are asked
to submit a single bid (p;Q): It potentially comes in three forms: the Ascending format, the First
Price and the Second Price auctions. These formats are self-explanatory given their description for
the menu auction.
Price-only Auctions: In price-only auctions, the buyer publishes a detailed request-for-quote (RFQ)
that sets minimum levels for each attribute. All o¤ers satisfying these conditions are evaluated on
a price basis. Again, it comes in three guises: Ascending, First Price and Second Price.
We now compare the performance of these alternative procedures with the performance of a scoring
auction that uses the true preference of the buyer as its scoring rule. Let Ukl (t) be the expected
utility of the buyer with taste t, in format k 2 fA; FP; SPg; and procedure l 2 fscore, menu;
beautyg (where scorestands for a scoring auction of the type described in the previous sections
with the scoring rule corresponding to the true preference of the buyer).
Theorem 3: For all t;
(a) UAscore(t) = U
A
menu(t) = U
A
beauty(t) as the bidding increment goes to zero,
(b) USPscore(t) = U
SP
menu(t) > U
SP
beauty(t)
Proof: See the Appendix.
For the Ascending auction, we build the unique symmetric equilibrium for each procedure. The
equivalence between all three procedures then stems from the direct comparison of the nal allo-
cations. For the Second Price format, we show that submitting schedule S = f(p;Q) such that
p = c(Q;); Q 2 RMg is the unique dominant strategy equilibrium in the menu auction. The
equivalence between the menu auction and the scoring auction with (Q) = v(Q; t) follows di-
rectly. For the beauty contest, we argue that the equilibrium bid (p;Q) must belong to S: Since
there is a positive probability that (p;Q) does not belong to max(p;Q)2Sfv(Q; t)   c(Q;)g for
the actual type - unknown to the suppliers - of the buyer, USPmenu > U
SP
beauty follows.
Theorem 3 understates the superiority of scoring auctions in two ways. First, scoring auctions are
likely to dominate both procedures because they save on bidding costs for suppliers. In practice,
the existence of bidding costs will limit the number of o¤ers made in a menu auction. This favors
the scoring auction. Likewise, the equivalence result for the beauty auction in the ascending format
requires that suppliers submit a very high number of bids. Second, the comparison in Theorem 3
is with a scoring auction with scoring rule (Q) = v(Q; t): As suggested by Che (1993) and Asker
and Cantillon (2005), the buyer will in general be better o¤ announcing (Q) 6= v(Q; t):
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We next consider the rst price menu auction. We rst show the following general result:
Theorem 4: Any equilibrium of the rst price menu auction is ine¢ cient.
Proof: See the Appendix
Theorem 4 follows from the following observations. If the equilibrium in the menu auction involves
pooling (the buyer o¤ers the same o¤er to di¤erent buyer types), ine¢ ciency is immediate. If,
instead, full separation occurs at equilibrium, ine¢ ciency arises from the tension between the
requirements of incentive compatibility and those of prot maximization. For the purposes of
prot maximization alone, suppliers are tempted to target di¤erent prot levels according to the
buyers type. The buyers incentive compatibility constraint limits the ability of suppliers to do this.
We argue that the buyers incentive compatibility constraint binds generically in any separating
equilibrium of the rst price menu auction and show that qualities are distorted as a result.12
The ine¢ ciency of the rst price menu auction is not necessarily bad news for the buyer if it
induces ercer competition. To investigate this question further, we focus on the more restricted
environment where private information is one-dimensional and the buyer can only have two types.13
The following theorem suggests that buyers with di¤erent types are likely to rank the two procedures
di¤erently.
Theorem 5 (adapted from Theorem 2 of Biglaiser and Mezzetti, 2000)14: Suppose Q;  2 R, t 2
ftL; tHg with tL < tH . Suppose vQ(Q; tH) > vQ(Q; tL) and vQQ(Q; tH)  vQQ(Q; tL) for all Q
and that cQ > 0: Then, in the symmetric equilibrium of the menu auction, UFPscore(tL)  UFPmenu(tL)
and UFPscore(tH)  UFPmenu(tH).
12There is an interesting analogy between our model and Rochet and Stole (2002)s screening model with a random
participation constraint. The source of randomness in our model is the o¤ers from a suppliers competitors. In
particular, we nd that there is no quality distortion at the top and at the bottom in the separating equilibrium of the
rst price menu auction, a result that mirrors the ndings in Rochet and Stole (2002). Rochet and Stole develop the
intuition for this nding at some length. They also reconcile it with the discrete type case in which there is distortion
at the bottom (see Theorem 5 and its proof below).
13When the equilibrium in the menu auction is known to be a separating equilibrium, then it is easy to show, using
the techniques developed in the proof of Theorem 4, that some buyer types prefer the menu auction while others
prefer the scoring auction. However, Rochet and Stole (2002) note that pooling is a common feature of equilibrium
in this class of models. How pooling a¤ects the welfare of di¤erent buyers in the menu auction is unclear without a
full charactization of the equilibrium.
14Biglaiser and Mezzetti consider a model in which multiple principals bid for the exclusive service (or e¤ort) of
an agent. Each principal has private information about their valuation of the service, while the agent has private
information about the disutility of providing service. The rst price menu auction considered here is the procurement
version of this model (with the agent being the buyer and the principals being the suppliers).
15
The proof of Theorem 5 closely follows that in Biglaiser and Mezzetti. A sketch is provided in the
Appendix pointing out how to adapt their arguments.
At equilibrium, suppliers o¤er two contracts, one targeted at the low type buyer, (QL; pL); and
the other targeted at the high type buyer, (QH ; pH): The inequalities in Theorem 5 are strict
whenever one of the incentive compatibility constraints (8); evaluated at the equilibrium o¤ers of
the scoring auction, binds. Biglaiser and Mezzeti (2000, Lemma 6) argue that this will be the case
when tL and tH are su¢ ciently close. Intuitively, when tL and tH are su¢ ciently distinct the two
contracts o¤ered by each supplier are su¢ ciently di¤erent that the low type buyer is not tempted
by the high type contract and vice versa. In that case, the bidding equilibrium in the truthful
scoring auction describes the equilibrium contracts for each type in the menu auction.15 When the
two buyer types are su¢ ciently close, the incentive compatibility constraints bind. Following the
intuition from the single-principal single-agent case, the price and quality of the low type buyer
is distorted downwards to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint of the high type buyer.
However, competition means that the participation constraint of the buyer is now endogenous from
the point of view of an individual supplier: it depends on the bids of the other suppliers. This
increases the costs of distorting the low type contract relative to the single-principal single-agent
benchmark. As a result, suppliers also use the price o¤ered to the high type buyer to help ensure
his incentive compatibility constraint is satised. Thus the price o¤ered to the high type buyer
decreases relative to the scoring auction and the high type buyer is better o¤.16
Biglaiser and Mezzetti point out that if the buyer knows his type prior to choosing a procedure,
unravelling of the buyers private information is likely: the low type buyer chooses a scoring auction,
leaving the high type as the only type to choose the menu auction. Because he no longer has any
private information, the menu and the scoring auction become equivalent again.
We now turn to the procedure where the buyer sets minimum quality standards and awards the
contract on the basis of price only.
Theorem 6: Consider any standard auction format where the high bidder wins and its equivalent
in the scoring auction. A buyer is always better o¤ using a scoring auction with a scoring rule
that corresponds to his true taste than imposing minimum quality standards / attribute levels and
selecting the winner on the basis of price only.
Proof: Suppose the buyer sets minimum quality standards Q = Q 2 RM : Since costs are increasing,
suppliers will set their quality levels at Q: We are now back to a standard procurement auction
15Thus the outcome is e¢ cient. This does not contradict Theorem 4 because Theorem 4 applies to the case where
the buyer has a continuum of types.
16The quality o¤ered to the high type buyer remains at the rst best.
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with symmetric bidders and costs c(Q;i) 2 R: Let x(n:N) denote the nth highest order statistics
from N draws of random variable x: From the revenue equivalence theorem, the expected utility of
the buyer from this minimum quality standard auction is
v(Q)  Ei [c(Q;i)(N 1:N)]
= Ei [v(Q)  c(Q;i)](2:N)
< Ei [max
Q
fv(Q)  c(Q;i)g(2:N)]
= Expected utility from the truthful scoring auction by Theorem 2. Q.E.D.
6 Concluding remarks
Our paper provides a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when private
information is multidimensional. We have characterized the set of equilibria in scoring auctions
and have argued that a single number, the suppliers pseudotype, is su¢ cient to describe the equi-
librium outcome in these auctions, when the scoring rule is quasilinear and types are independently
distributed. In doing so, we have drawn on the equivalence between the reduced form of a scoring
auction and that of a standard single object IPV auction. We have also derived a new expected
utility equivalence theorem for scoring auctions. Both results extend existing theories of scoring
auctions.
In addition, we have shown that several other candidate procedures for buying di¤erentiated prod-
ucts, including some, like the menu auction and the beauty contest, that also combine competition
with the exibility of deciding on all the dimensions of the product, are dominated by scoring
auctions. These results suggest that scoring auctions provide a useful mechanism (they are simple
straightforward procedures) for buying di¤erentiated products.
We conclude with a few remarks on potential venues for further research:
Suppliers uncertainty about their costs at the time of bidding: In our model, it was immaterial
whether bidders were committed to their o¤er or to the scores that their o¤er generated. Suppose
now that the cost of attribute Q is given by c(Q;; ) where only  is known to the supplier at the
time of bidding and  is known before the contract is executed. Dene k() = E [maxQf(Q)  
c(Q;; )gg: Our equilibrium characterization results go through with this redened pseudotype.
The only di¤erence is that the delivered quality level now generically di¤ers from the o¤ered quality
level because the delivered quality will solve maxQf(Q)  c(Q;; ) for the realization of  : This
provides a rationale for making the scores, rather than the actual o¤ers, binding. Thus low cost
realizations generate higher levels of quality and higher prices for the supplier, whereas negative
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cost shocks generated lower qualities and lower prices.17 This added exibility is another advantage
of the scoring auction relative to the other procedures that set the quality to be delivered at the
contracting stage.
Non contractible quality dimensions: An essential assumption for all our results is that quality is
contractible. When some dimensions of the good are contractible and others not, contracting can
generate perverse incentives as Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) have shown. At the same time, it
seems desirable to generalize the analysis of procurement mechanisms to such environments (see,
Che (2006) for a discussion of possible mechanisms).
Implications for empirical work: Even in the presence of symmetric suppliers, scoring auctions
present interesting auction design questions (e.g. how can the buyer manipulate the scoring rule
to its advantage?). However, scoring auctions present two di¢ culties from the point of view of
identication: the identication of the functional form for the costs and the identication of the
distribution of private information. One consequence of our su¢ cient statistics result is that the
distribution of types will generally be non identied on the basis of auction data, even when the
functional form for the costs is known. Indeed, the observed information (the scores) is one-
dimensional while the information to be inferred is multidimensional. This suggests two possible
solutions. When the (p;Q) o¤ers rather than the scores are binding, the observed data is again
multidimensional.18 Another possibility is to look at auction data where changes in the scoring
rule can be exploited. In any case, our paper provides a theoretical basis from which investigation
of identication is feasible.
7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3, part (a): We discretize the price grid. Let  be the minimum price (and
therefore prot and utility) increment. We proceed in two steps, comparing rst the menu auction
and then beauty contest to the scoring auction.
Step 1: Menu auction: The following is an equilibrium. In round 1; each bidder submits a schedule
that generates at most zero utility for the buyer, that is, f(p;Q); Q 2 RM , p  c(Q;) = constant
and maxtmax(p;Q)fv(Q; t)   pg = 0g. Let t be the prot level corresponding to the period
t schedule for a given supplier. At round t; this supplier submits schedule f(p;Q); Q 2 RM ,
p   c(Q;) = t 1   g as long as t 1     0 if his o¤er was not selected in round t   1:19
17The US Highway procurement authorities use such a reward / penalty scheme.
18Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis (2006) analyze data from highway paving procurement that have this feature. The
approach they use involves a theoretical structure that employs aspects of the approach developed here.
19Note that it is a best response for the buyer to select the o¤er he truthfully prefers at each round. Note also that
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This is an equilibrium (we can adapt the arguments in Bikhchandani et al. 2002 to argue that the
outcome of this strategy is the unique equilibrium outcome in symmetric strategies). Each supplier
participates as long as a positive prot can be made, otherwise they exit. The selected level of
attributes, Q; satises Q = argmaxQfv(Q; t)   c(Q;)g for the realization of t: The nal price
satises p = v(Q; t)   maxQfv(Q; t)   ec(Q; e)g (modulo the increment) where ec(Q; e) refers to
the cost function of the second best supplier. This is the outcome of the scoring auction.
Step 2: Beauty contest: The following is an equilibrium. In round 1; each bidder submits a bid in
the schedule that generates at most zero utility for the buyer, that is, f(p;Q);Q 2 RM , p c(Q;) =
constant and maxtmax(p;Q)fv(Q; t)  pg = 0g. Let t be the prot level corresponding to the bid
in period t for a given supplier. At round t; if this supplier was not the winner in round t  1; he
submits any bid in schedule f(p;Q); Q 2 RM , p c(Q;) = t 1g that he has not submitted in the
past. If no unsubmitted bid remains in this schedule, the supplier submits a bid in f(p;Q);Q 2 RM ,
p   c(Q;) = t 1   g as long as t 1     0. The process continues until no further bid is
received. As before, the equilibrium strategies yield the unique equilibrium outcome. The winner in
the beauty contest is the same as in the menu auction. However, the buyer may not be equally well
o¤ as in the menu auction since here, he cannot choose the (p;Q) pair that maximizes his utility.
However, as  goes to zero, the winning (p;Q) must maximize v(Q; t)   c(Q;). Otherwise, the
winning bidder could have won with a higher level of prot. This is ruled out by his bidding
behavior. Thus, the buyer is equally well o¤.
Proof of Theorem 3, part (b): We proceed in two steps, comparing rst the menu auction and then
beauty contest to the scoring auction.
Step 1: Menu auction: An argument mirroring the argument for the standard second price auction
establishes that f(p;Q); p = c(Q;); Q 2 RMg is a dominant strategy equilibrium. Equivalence
with the scoring auction follows from the fact that suppliers submit bids such that p = c(Q;) in
the dominant strategy equilibrium of the scoring auction, with Q = argmaxfv(Q; t)   c(Q;)g:
By Lemma 3, this is also the bid selected by the buyer in the winning schedule. The best second
o¤ers in both auctions are also identical.
Step 2: Beauty contest: In equilibrium, suppliers submit an equilibrium bid (p;Q) in the schedule
f(p; c(Q;)); p = c(Q;); Q 2 RMg: Consider any alternative bid (p;Q) such that p  c(Q;) > 0:
The expected prot generated by this bid is equal to
prob ((p;Q) generates the highest score) (Ep  c(Q;))
Lemma 3 ensures that the menu induces productive e¢ ciency.
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where Ep is the expected resulting price determined by the second best o¤er. The deviation
(bp; c(Q;)) where bp = c(Q;) dominates. The expected prot it generates is equal to
prob ((p;Q) generates the highest score) (Ep  c(Q;)) +
prob ((bp;Q) generates the highest score but (p;Q) does not) (Eep  c(Q;))
where Eep is the expected price given that (bp;Q) generates the highest score but (p;Q) does not.
Clearly, Eep   c(Q;) > 0: (p;Q) such that p   c(Q;) < 0 is similarly dominated. From the
buyers point of view, the utility from (p;Q) 2 f(p; c(Q;)); Q 2 RM ; p = c(Q;)g is lower than
maxfv(Q; t)  p; p = c(Q;); Q 2 RMg with strictly positive probability. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4: If the menu auction equilibrium involves pooling of o¤ers then ine¢ ciency
is immediate. Thus, we direct attention to equilibria where full separation occurs (a full menu is
o¤ered by each supplier).
Consider the optimization problem faced by a supplier of type : Let U(t;) denote the utility
received by a buyer of type t from a supplier of type  in the equilibrium of the menu auction: The
buyers incentive compatibility constraint can be rewritten as
d
dt
U(t;) = vt(Q(t;); t) (A1)
(with second order conditionrtQ(t;)  0): Let Pr(U; t) denote the equilibrium probability that an
o¤er generating a level of utility U for a buyer of type t wins. Ignoring the second order condition,
the suppliers problem can be written as:20
max
Q(:;);U(:;)
Z t
t
(v(Q(t;); t)  c(Q(t;);)  U(t;)) Pr(U(t;); t)h(t)dt
subject to (A1)
This is a standard optimal control problem with U being the state variable and Q being the control
variables. The Hamiltonian is given by
H(Q; ; U; t) = (v(Q(t;); t)  c(Q(t;);)  U(t;)) Pr(U(t;); t)h(t) + (t;)vt(Q(t;); t)
If a solution exists, it must satisfy the following rst order conditions (where we have dropped the
arguments for simplicity):
(vQ(Q; t)  cQ(Q;)) Pr(U; t)h(t) + (t;)vQt(Q; t) = 0 (A2)
  (v   c  U) d
dU
Pr(U; t)h(t) + Pr(U; t)h(t) = 0 (A3)
20 If the solution to this problem violates the second order condition, pooling must occur at equilibrium.
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with (t;) = (t;) = 0:
To complete the proof we now argue that (t;) 6= 0 for a positive measure of t; that is, the buyers
incentive constraint binds. Towards a contradiction, suppose it does not. Then the equilibrium
in the menu auction corresponds to the equilibrium in the scoring auction as t varies. Denote by
(Qs(t;); ps(t;))t2T the menu generated from the equilibrium o¤ers submitted by a supplier of
type  in the scoring auction as t varies. From Corollary 1 and the known characterization of the
equilibrium in the single object IPV auction, the suppliers ex-post prot in the scoring auction is
given by
k(t;)  Ee[k(t; e)(1:N 1)jk(t; e)(1:N 1) < k(t;)]
where k(t;) is the pseudotype that corresponds to type  when the scoring rule is equal to
v(Q; t)   p; and k(t; e)(1:N 1) denotes the rst order statistics of N   1 independent draws of
pseudotypes. By the envelope theorem, kt(t;) = vt(Q(t;); t): It is independent of the distribution
of : By contrast, the second term and its derivative with respect to t is a function of the distribution
of : Thus the two terms do not cancel out and ex-post prots depend on t for a given  (except
if supplier  wins with zero probability for all t): This implies - by Lemma 3 - that the menu that
corresponds to the equilibrium in the scoring auction is not incentive compatible, a contradiction.
When (t;) 6= 0; equation (A2) implies that qualities are distorted away from their e¢ cient levels.
Q.E.D.21
Sketch of Proof of Theorem 5: Here we show how to adapt the arguments in Biglaiser and Mezzetti
(2000, Theorems 1 and 2) to t our procurement framework.22
Let Uj () be the utility of a type j buyer from the contract supplier  o¤ers to him. Let  1 (Uj)
be the inverse of Uj () : Let Pr (tL) = p. The bidding problem faced by each supplier is given by
max
QL;QH ;UL;UH
p [v (QL; tL)  c (QL; )  UL]
 
1 G   1 (UL)N 1
+(1  p) [v (QH ; tH)  c (QH ; )  UH ]
 
1 G   1 (UH)N 1
subject to the following incentive compatibility constraints:
ICH : v (QH ; tH)  pH  v (QL; tH)  pL
ICL : v (QL; tL)  pL  v (QH ; tL)  pH
Assuming that ICL is slack (this is veried ex-post) and rewriting ICL as follows:
UH  v (QL; tH)  v (QL; tL) + UL
21(t;) must follow the law of motion (A3) together with the boundary conditions (t;) = (t;): In particular,
this implies no distortion at the top and at the bottom.
22For details the reader is referred to Biglaiser and Mezzetti (2000).
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gives rise to the following Lagrangian for biddersoptimization problem:
L() = p [v (QL; tL)  c (QL; )  UL]
 
1 G   1 (UL)N 1
+ (1  p) [v (QH ; tH)  c (QH ; )  UH ]
 
1 G   1 (UH)N 1
+  () (1 G ())N 1 [UH   v (QL; tH) + v (QL; tL)  UL]
Of interest to us are the rst order conditions with respect to UL and UH which can be written as
@UL
@
=

p (N   1) g ()
( () + p) (1 G ()) (v (QH ; tH)  c (QH ; )  UH)

(A4)
@UH
@
=

(1  p) (N   1) g ()
(1  ( () + p)) (1 G ()) (v (QL; tL)  c (QL; )  UL)

(A5)
When  () = 0; ICH does not bind and the menu auction is equivalent to two independent scoring
auctions. When  () > 0; ICH does bind. In this case, UH increases and UL decreases. To see
this note that (A4) implies UH is increasing in  () and (A5) implies UL is decreasing in  () : It
follows that UFPmenu (tL)  UFPscoring (tL) and UFPmenu (tH)  UFPscoring (tH) : Q.E.D.
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